Abstract. This work is motivated by the observation that in DES-like ciphexs it is possible to choose the round functions in such a way that every non-trivial one-round characteristic has small probability. This gives rise to the following definition. A mapping is called differentially uniform if for every non-mro input difference and any output difference the number of possible inputs has a uniform upper bound. The examples of differentially uniform mappings provided in this paper have also other desirable cryptographic properties: large distance from ailbe functions, high nonlinear order and efficient computability.
Introduction
The most successful and widely used block cipher has been the DES algorithm which was designed in the seventies. By the time, however, it has become too small, the key size being only 56 bits, and all attempts to increase the security by extending the DES by parallel or serial implementetations have failed.
In recent years the DES has been extensively analyzed in order to capture its properties of strength. Special attention has been focused on the nonlinearity properties of the round function, which is composed of permutations and eight small parallel substitution transformations, the S-boxes. It seems that the security can be increased only by increasing the size of the S-boxes or possibly by replacing the set of small parallel substitutions by one large transformation with desirable properties.
The necessary criteria for a substitution transformation or a round function of DES-like cipher include the following.
(i) High nonlinearity, large distance from linear functions; (ii) High nonlinear order, the degrees of the outputbit functioiis are large: (iii) Resistance against the differential cryptanalysis; and (iv) Efficient construction and computability.
To satisfy requirement (iii) it is enough that for every fixed nonzero input difference to the function no output difference occurs with high probability. In other words, it is required that there is a uniform upperbound to the probability of the possible output differences. If this holds 110 strong characteristics for the success of the differential cryptanalysis exist as was proven in [ 7 ] .
The purpose of this paper is to give examples of transformations of GF( 2" ) with properties (i) -(iv). Moreover, all these transformations are extendable in the sense that if parametrized by the length of the input, the complexity of the construction and implementation is polynomial but the security is exponential with key of linear length. 
The resistance of DES-like ciphers against differential attacks
Let (C,+) be a finite Abelian group, G' a subgroup of G, Fi : C + G' mappings, and E, : G' + G such that Ei-Ei(0) is an injective group homomorphism, i = 1,2,. . . , P. We define an r-round DES-like cipher over G as follows. 
Given a plaintext
s, we say that x holds for x and k if X* -x = a(0) and
for all i = 1 , 2 , . . . , s, or what is the same, i.e., the probability of a characteristic is the product of the probabilities of its rounds.
To compute the one-round probabilities we assume that Ki is uniformly random. Let us denote
where Z E G is uniformly random. This shows, in particular, that the one-round probabilities are independent of x . In the terminology of [4] this means that a DES-like cipher over an Abelian group is a Markov cipher with respect to the canonical difference.
Given a, b E G' let us denote
where Z E G is uniformly random. Then
To prove resistance against differential cryptanalysis it suffices to show that for any given (or chosen) input pair ( x , x') the probability of guessing correctly the difference x * ( s ) -x(s), without any knowledge of the used key, is too small to be useful. the probability of getting x * ( s ) -x ( s ) = j3 from ( X I , x ) with x* = x + a is the sum of the probabilities of the different characteristics This motivates the following definition.
DEFINITION. Let G1 and G2 be finite Abelian groups. A mapping F : G1 4 Ga is called differentially &uniform if for all a E GI, Q # 0, and fl E G2 Now the result of the theorem can be stated as follows: If the round functions of a DES-like cipher over G are differentially 6-uniform and the round keys are independent and uniformly random then for every given input pair (x +Q,x), a # 0, the average probability over the keys t o obtain an output diflerence j9 # 0 at the sth round, s 2 4, is less than or equal t o 2(6/1G1)2.
Examples of differentially 2-uniform mappine are the almost perfect nonlinear permutations of GF(2") as defined in [7] . If m -n output coordinates of a permutation of GF(2m) with property (P) (see [7] ) are omitted the resulting mapping from GF(2m) to GF(2") is differentially 2m-n+1-uniform.
The purpose of this paper is to give other examples. The following two facts are useful. PROPOSITION 1. Let A : GI + GI and B : G2 -c G2 be group isomorphisms and F : GI + Gz be differentially 6-uniform. Then B o F o A is differentially 6-uniform. PROPOSITION 2. Let F : GI t G2 be a differentially &uniform bijection. Then the inverse mapping of F is differentially &uniform. for all x E GF(2"), which is equivalent to or, if y # 0, (wF(y))2'-1 = 1, from which we get exactly 2j -1 nonzero solutions y, since F is assumed to be a permutation. This completes the proof.
If n is odd, 1 < k < n and gcd(n,k) = 1, then the power polynomial F(x) = x2*+' in GF(2") is a differentially 2-uniform permutation. The public key cryptosystem C ' [5] is based on power polynomial permutations with n = (2& + 1)2' and k = b2', 1 5 b 5 1. By Proposition 3 the coordinate functions of these polynomials are the more linear the larger T is. Finally notice that for n = 2m the polynomial F ( x ) = x2'+l in GF(2") is never a permutation.
The degree of a Boolean function f is the polynomial degree of the algebraic normal form off and is denoted by deg(f). Let us denote by w2(k) the 2-weight of a non-negative integer k . One proof of the following well-known result can be found in [2] . PROPOSITION 4. Let w E GF(2"), w # 0 and let x H xe be a permutation of
GF(2"). Then deg(tr(wxe)) = wz(e).
The permutations x w xZkt1 in GF(2"), n odd, satisfy properties (i), (iii) and 
where the third equality follows from the fact that the mapping i H ki permutes the integers modulo n if gcd(n, k) = 1.
As a conclusion we list the following properties of the inverse of F ( x ) = xZk+' in GF(2") with n odd and gcd(n, k) = 1.
(i) h / ( F -' ) = miryominL I,,,. minXEGq-p) d(tr(wF-'(x)), L ( x ) ) = 2"-1 -2 + :
(ii) deg(tr(wF-l(x))) = w2((zk + l)-l mod (2" -1)) = y; We list the following properties of the inversion mapping in GF(2"). to n.
A mapping derived from the exponent mapping in a prime field
Let p be a prime and consider the Abelian group G = {0,1,. . . , p -1) with the modulo p addition. Let u be an element of order q in the finite field GF(p). We define a mapping F : G + G as follows: F ( t ) = u", for t E G, where the exponentiation is computed in GF(p).
Let a , p E G and a # 0. Then the equation
&+a)
mod P -u" = p (6) is equivalent to u " +~ -uz = p and 0 5 t 5 p -a -1 (7) { : z + a -P -u z = p a n d p -a l t < p -l . (8) Since the solution t of is unique modulo q it follows that (7) has at most [ 7 1 solutions in G. Similarily equation (8) The mapping F defined in this section seems to be complex enough to be used as round function of a DES-like cipher over the integers modulo a prime with a small number of rounds. The computational complexity of such a cipher grows with the order of the base element u. Proposition 7 shows the trade-off between the complexity of the enciphering (and deciphering) algorithm and the security against differential cryptanalysis. However, the high nonlinear order of the inversion mapping and the inverses of x2*+l comes into effect if these mappings are combined with appropriately chosen linear or affine permutations which may vary from round to round and depend on the secret key. Hereby the virtues (i), (ii) and (iv) presented in $1 are not destroyed since they are linear invariants. By Proposition 1 the same is true for the differential uniformness that quarantees (iii).
An anonymous referee of this paper posed a natural question whether our approach is relevant to the situation where an attacker uses a notion of difference other than xor in his differential cryptanalysis attack. In our view, regarding DES-like ciphers, resistance against zor-differential analysis has no less crucial relevance as resistance against linear approximation.
Naturally, as well as a cryptanalyst may try any type of approximation he may try any type of differentials. Since all our examples of differentially uniform mappings in GF(2") are multiplicative, we should consider differential cryptanalysis with respect to the multiplicative difference x * x -l 1 for x * , x E GF(2").
Let us assume that F is a multiplicative permutation and A a linear permutation in GF(2"). Then for a DES-like cipher with F o A as a round function, the probability of every one-round multiplicative differential with a # 1 is 
Recent related work.
Some of the results of this paper were independently obtained by T. Beth and C. Ding. They present also more examples of almost perfect nonlinear permutations in their paper which is the next to follow in these proceedings.
